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The Attorney as Advocate and Witness: Does the
Prohibition of an Attorney Acting as Advocate and
Witness at a Judicial Trial also Apply in Administrative
Adjudications?
Arnold Rochvarg *

I. INTRODUCTION

It is generally accepted that an attorney who is representing a
client at a judicial trial is not permitted to also be a witness at the
same trial. This prohibition on an attorney acting as both an advocate
and a witness at a trial appears in every state's rules of professional
conduct. This rule, often referred to as the "lawyer as witness" rule,
has application in attorney disciplinary proceedings, rulings on the
admissibility of evidence, motions seeking disqualification of an
attorney who intends to testify, legal malpractice cases, and petitions
for the award of attorney's fees. The lawyer as witness rule has also
been applied in administrative adjudications. There is a split of
authority, however, whether the lawyer as witness rule does apply in
administrative adjudications. The purpose of this article is to discuss
the present state of the law with regard to the attorney/advocate as
witness prohibition in administrative adjudications, and to suggest a
proposal for how this issue should be handled by administrative
agencies and administrative adjudicators.
II. THE ABA's DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTORNEy/ADVOCATE
AS WITNESS PROHIBITION

The American Bar Association (ABA) has been the primary force
in the development of professional standards for attorneys in the
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United States. The ABA's first official statement of the prohibition
on an attorney/advocate testifying as a witness was in Canon 19 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted in 1908. 1 Titled
"Appearance of Lawyer as Witness for His Client," Canon 19
provided that:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to
merely formal matters, such as the attestation or
custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave
the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when
essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid
testifying in court on behalf of his client. 2
From 1908 until the mid 1960s, the ABA Canons formed the
basis of the ethical standards for attorneys in every state. During
these years, the language of Canon 19 was not changed.
In 1964, the ABA appointed a committee to study whether the
Canons should be replaced. This committee proposed a new set of
ethical standards called the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code). This Code was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in
1969. By 1980, the Code had been adopted by just about every state,
thus replacing the Canons as the standard set of ethical rules for
attorneys.3 The new Code addressed the attorney/advocate as witness
issue in a few places. First, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-101(B) stated
that "A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated or
pending litigation if he knows or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in
his firm ought to be called as a witness" except if the lawyer's
testimony relates to (1) an uncontested matter; (2) a matter of
formality and there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence
will be offered in opposition; (3) the testimony relates to the nature
and value of legal services rendered; or (4) if substantial hardship
would result to the client if the attorney/advocate was disqualified. 4
Secondly, DR 5-102 (A) provided that:

1. ABA CANONS OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 19 (1908).
2.Id.
3. See S. Gillers & R. Simon, Editor's Introduction, Regulation of Lawyers:
Statutes and Standards, ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (2005).
4. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-101(B) (1980.

Spring 2006

Attorney as Advocate and Witness

3

If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or
pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that
he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a
witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from
the conduct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall not
continue representation in the trial .... 5
Unlike the ABA Canons which had served as the model for the
state codes of professional conduct for over sixty years, the ABA
Code, including DR 5-101 and DR 5-102, had been in existence for
only seven years when the ABA appointed a new commission to
study whether the Code needed to be revised. This commission's
recommendation was that the ABA should adopt an entirely new set
of standards of professional conduct. The result of the work of this
commission were the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) which were adopted by the ABA in 1983. Most states
over the next ten years replaced their versions of the ABA Code with
standards based on the ABA Model Rules. The Model Rules'
formulation of the "Lawyer as Witness" rule appears in Model Rule
3.7.6 Rule 3.7 provides that:
A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which
the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except
where: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested
issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value
of legal services rendered in the case; or (3)
disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial
hardship on the client. 7
Since their adoption in 1983, there have been various changes
made by the ABA to its Model Rules. Except for the stylistic change
of replacing "except where" with "unless" before the three
exceptions, Model Rule 3.7 has not been changed.

5. Id., DR 5-102(A). Ethical Considerations 5-9 and 5-lO ofthe ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility also discuss the lawyer as witness prohibition. Id.
6. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.7(1983).
7.Id.
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A. Support for Applying the Lawyer as Witness Rule in
Administrative Adjudications
Support for not permitting an attorney to serve the dual roles of
advocate and witness at an administrative adjudication can be found
in published opinions from federal administrative law judges, state
courts, and state bar association ethics committees. These opinions
have relied upon both the ABA Model Code and the ABA Model
Rules in their analyses. This section of the article will discuss these
OpInIOns.
1. Administrative Opinions
A motion to disqualify an attorney before the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC) was granted by an
administrative law judge (AL1) in In re Certain Plastic Light Duty
Screw Anchors. 8 The attorney who was scheduled to appear at the
USITC hearing had played a major role in the negotiation and
drafting of agreements that were central to the merits of the case. In
a written decision, the ALJ relied on Model Code DR 5-101(B) in
ordering the disqualification of the attorney because the attorney was
a person who "ought to be called as a witness."9 The ALJ in this case
also found the "substantial hardship" exception of DR 5-101(B)
inapplicable because this exception only applied if the attorney's
Distinctiveness had not been
testimony was "distinctive."10
demonstrated here. The ALJ also noted that added expense and
inconvenience to the client were not sufficient to establish substantial
hardship. I I
In a case before the Federal Communications Commission, an
ALI relied on ABA Model Rule 3.7 in ordering the disqualification
of an attorney representing an applicant for a construction permit of a
new FM radio station. 12 The ALI reasoned that because the attorney

8. In re Certain Plastic Light Duty Screw Anchors, No. 337-TA-158, Order
No.7, 1984 WL 273813 (U.S.I.T.C., Jan. 13, 1984).
9.Id.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12. In re Wind River Cornmc'n, Inc., 96 F.C.C.2d 1251 (1984).
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was a "necessary witness," disqualification of the attorney was
required. 13 The FCC Review Board upheld the ALJ's decision.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board in In re Houston Lighting and Power Company,
relied on both ABA Model Code DR 5-1 02(A) and ABA Model Rule
3.7 in deciding a motion to disqualify an attorney who was scheduled
to appear as a fact witness at the upcoming hearing.14 The Board
concluded that both the "ought to be called as a witness" language in
DR 5-1 02(A) and the "likely to be a necessary witness" language in
Rule 3.7 applied to this attorneyY The Board denied the motion to
disqualify, however, based on the substantial hardship exception in
both the Model Code and the Model Rules. 16 Substantial hardship
was demonstrated because the attorney had been lead counsel in this
matter for twelve years, and had knowledge of technical matters in
the "unique administrative forum" of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. 17 Moreover, the Board was influenced by the opposing
party's admission that it would not be prejudiced by opposing
counsel's proposed dual roles of advocate and witness, and that the
attorney's "sophisticated client" had made an informed waiver of the
issue. IS
In In re Certain Convertible Rowing Exercisers, an ALJ in a
United States International Trade Commission case also relied on
both the ABA Model Code and the ABA Model Rules in deciding
whether to disqualify an attorney who the opposing party intended to
call as a witness. 19 Although recognizing that neither the ABA
Model Code nor ABA Model Rules had been "formally
incorporated" in the USITC's rules of practice and procedure, the
ALJ ruled that their application was appropriate under the ALJ's
"general authority to ensure fairness to all parties to this
proceeding. ,,20 The ALJ denied the motion to disqualify the attorney.
13.Id.
14. In re Wind River Commc'n, Inc., 96 F.C.C.2d 1251 (1984).
15.Id.
16.Id.
17.Id.
18.Id.
19. In re Certain Convertible Rowing Exercisers, No. 337-TA-212, Order No.
45, 1985 WL 303746 (U.S.I.T.C., July 30, 1985).
20. /d.
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The ALI ruled that the substantial hardship exception under both the
Model Code and Model Rules applied because there had been a long
professional relationship between the client and lawyer in this
complex case which had been in preparation for a long time.2i
Moreover, the ALI was influenced by the voluminous pleadings in
the case and that the motion to disqualify had been filed less than one
month before the hearing date. 22 Moreover, this case was subject to a
stringent statutory time limit. 23 The ALI also cited the ABA Model
Rule's dual concerns for prejudice to the opposing party and potential
conflict between the attorney and the client. 24 In this case, the ALI
wrote, the opposing party would only be prejudiced if the attorney
was not allowed to testify.25 Additionally, the attorney's client had
no intent to call its attorney to testify. The ALI also wrote that ABA
Model Rule 3.7 "was not designed to permit a lawyer to call
opposing counsel as a witness and thereby disqualify him as
counsel.,,26
United States v. Scandia Interiors, Inc. involved a motion before
the Executive Office of Immigration Review, Office of the Chief
Administrative Hearing Officer, to prevent Scandia's counsel from
acting in the dual capacity of advocate and witness. 27 The opinion
relied on DR 5-101(B) of the Model Code for its conclusion that
disqualification was required because the dual roles were "ethically
improper. ,,28
The General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals
applied Rule 3.7 of the District of Columbia Rules of Professional
Conduct (based on ABA Model Rule 3.7) in deciding whether to
disqualify the entire law firm of an attorney who would be testifying
at the upcoming hearing. 29 The attorney had already voluntarily
21.Id.
22.Id.
23. /d.
24.Id.
25.Id.
26.Id.
27. United States v. Scandia Interiors, Inc., Case No. 90100229, 1990
O.C.A.H.O. LEXIS 73 (O.C.A.H.O., Nov. 26, 1990).
28.Id.
29. Appeal of B.G.W. Ltd. P'ship, 91-3 BCA P 24336, GSBCA No. 10501,
1991 WL 168711 (G.S.B.C.A., Aug. 28,1991).
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withdrawn from representing the client, but the motion sought
disqualification of every lawyer at the firm. Because District of
Columbia Rule 3.7 did not require disqualification of the entire law
firm, the motion to disqualify was denied. 3o
In another case before the United States International Trade
Commission, In re Certain Salinomycin Biomass and Preparations
Containing Same, the ALJ relied upon the substantial hardship
exception in ABA Model Rule 3.7 in denying a motion to disqualify
an attorney who planned to testify at the hearing. 3 ) Substantial
hardship was demonstrated based on the following factors: the
attorney had been involved in all aspects of the pre-hearing phase of
the investigations; the attorney had conducted almost all of the
depositions; the attorney had devoted more time to the case than any
other attorney; and the hearing was scheduled in less than two
weeks. 32
In re Equal Access to Justice Act of Gaffny Corporation involved
a petition for attorney's fees before the United States Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals. 33 The petition was opposed, inter alia,
on the ground that the petitioning party had not acted as an attorney
at the earlier administrative hearing where he had also testified. 34 It
was argued the petitioning party's role at the earlier hearing was
merely in his capacity as an officer of a corporation that was a party
in the case. 35 Two of the three administrative law judges deciding
this matter voted to award most of the attorney's fees which the
attorney had requested. 36 One ALJ dissented. 37 The dissent's
position was that the petitioner had not acted as an attorney at the
hearing and thus was not entitled to any attorney's fees. 38 The
dissenting ALJ relied on ABA Model Rule 3.7 and DR 5-101 and DR
30. !d.
31. In re Certain Salinomycin Biomass & Preparations Containing Same, No.
337-TA-370, Order No. 13, 1995 WL 945673 (U.S.I.T.C., May 25, 1995).
32.Id.
33. In re Equal Access to Justice Act of Gaffny Corp., 96-1 BCA P 28060,
ASBCA No. 39740, 1995 WL 669056 (A.S.B.C.A., Oct. 25, 1995).
34.Id.
35.Id.
36.Id.
37.Id.
38.Id.
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5-102 of the Massachusetts Code of Professional Responsibility
(based on the ABA Model Code) to support his conclusion. 39 The
dissent reasoned that if the petitioning attorney "had appeared as a
lawyer, he would have faced the ethical dilemma" of acting as both
attorney and witness. 4o Therefore, in order to avoid finding that the
attorney had engaged in unethical conduct, the proper conclusion was
that the petitioner had not acted as an attorney at the earlier
administrative hearing.
Although it was not necessary for its decision in In re Certain
Mechanical Lumbar Supports and Products Containing Same, an
administrative law judge in a matter before the United States
International Trade Commission cited Rule 3.7 of the Michigan
Rules of Professional Conduct (based on ABA Model Rule 3.7) as an
alternative reason to disqualify attorneys who the ALJ had already
disqualified on the ground of conflict of interest with a former
client. 41 The ALJ noted that continued representation "would likely
violate the Lawyer as Witness rule" in Rule 3.7. 42
2. Judicial Opinions
The preceding section has demonstrated that federal
administrative law judges have relied upon ABA Model Rule 3.7 and
ABA Model Code DR 5-101 and DR 5-102, and state provisions
based on the ABA Model Rules and ABA Model Code, in deciding
various motions in administrative adjudications. Several judicial
opinions at the state level are in concurrence with these
administrative opinions that the ethical rules adopted by the ABA
should be applied to administrative adjudications. This section will
discuss these cases.
Lavin v. Civil Service Commission, a case from Illinois, involved
the appeal of the discharge from public employment of a state safety
inspector based on his alleged failure to leave inspection forms with
plants he had visited. 43 The inspector (Lavin) testified at the
39.Id.
40.Id.
41. In re Certain Mech. Lumbar Supports & Prods. Containing Same, No. 337TA-415, 1998 ITC LEXIS 283 (U.S.I.T.C., Nov. 2, 1998).
42.Id. at *17.
43. Lavin v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 310 N.E.2d 858 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).

Spring 2006

Attorney as Advocate and Witness

9

administrative hearing that he had not visited a particular plant in
over one month, thus explaining the lack of an inspection form at the
plant.44 An assistant attorney general who served as counsel for the
Department of Labor, the employing agency, was then sworn as a
rebuttal witness. He testified that he had recently seen Lavin at that
plant. 45 Several other witnesses also testified at the hearing. In his
findings, the presiding hearing officer found Lavin's testimony
"incredible," and recommended discharge from service. 46 The Civil
Service Commission adopted the hearing officer's fmdings and
ordered Lavin's discharge. 47 Upon judicial review, the circuit court
judge reversed the agency decision because Lavin "had not been
afforded a fair and impartial trial.,,48 The circuit court judge listed
three factors as supporting his conclusion: (1) evidence had been
introduced of a prior suspension of Lavin unrelated to the suspension
now at issue; (2) improper contact by the state with witnesses prior to
the hearing; and (3) Lavin had been improperly called as a witness by
the state. 49 The circuit court judge made no mention of the testimony
of the Assistant Attorney General at the administrative hearing. An
Illinois intermediate appellate court disagreed with the circuit court
judge that Lavin had been denied a fair hearing. The court rejected
each reason discussed by the lower court. The appellate court,
however, continued that:
Although we conclude that plaintiff was afforded a
fair hearing, we condemn the conduct of the Assistant
Attorney General. While acting as counsel for the
Department of Labor, a public body, he abandoned his
role as advocate and became a witness for the party he
was representing without withdrawing from the case.
The practice of acting as both advocate and witness

44. Id. at 860.
45. /d.
46. /d. at 862.
47.Id. at 863.
48. /d.
49.Id.
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has been consistently frowned upon and discouraged
by the legal profession. 5o
The court cited Ethical Consideration 5-9 and the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility to support its position. The court added
that "[i]n the instant case, the conduct was totally unnecessary and
inexcusable.,,51 The court, however, did not provide any remedy.
International Paper Co. v. Wilson, involved a workers
compensation claim in Arkansas. 52 Wilson was a worker at a paper
factory whose leg was crushed by a paper machineY As well as
filing a workers compensation claim against his employer,
International Paper Co., Wilson filed a products liability lawsuit in
federal court against the manufacturer of the machine, Beloit
Corporation. 54 Beloit agreed to settle with Wilson for $50,000. 55
Under Arkansas law, this settlement required approval by the
The settlement was
Workers Compensation Commission. 56
presented to an administrative law judge of the Commission on a
stipulation of facts along with affidavits. 57 Most significant to this
article, one of the affidavits was filed by Wilson's attorney. 58 In this
sworn affidavit, he stated that: (1) he had personally examined the
paper machine that had injured Wilson;59 (2) he had hired an
engineering firm to inspect the paper machine;6o (3) it was his
opinion that the products liability case filed in federal court against
Beloit would most likely not be successful;61 (4) it was his opinion
that the acts of International Paper in losing and/or destroying certain
bolts on the paper machine "weigh[ ed] heavily" against a successful

50. Id. at 865.
51.Id.
52. Int'I Paper Co. v. Wilson, 805 S.W.2d 668 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991).
53.Id. at 668.
54.Id.
55. !d.
56. See, ARK CODE ANN § 11-9-401(c) (1987).
57. Int'I Paper Co, 805 S.W.2d at 688.
58.Id.
59. !d. at 669.
60.Id.
61.Id.
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outcome against Beloit in the products liability case;62 (5) it was his
opinion that a better case existed against International Paper for
losing or destroying the bolts;63 and (6) the $50,000 settlement with
Beloit was in the best interest of his client. 64 Based on several
affidavits, including Wilson's attorney's affidavit, the ALl filed a
written opinion which was adopted by the full Commission
approving the settlement. 65
The Commission's decision was then subjected to judicial review
in the Arkansas Court of Appeals. On the issue relevant to this
article, the court ruled that Rule 3.7 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct applied in worker's compensation
proceedings. 66 Rule 3.7, however, was not applicable to this case
because Wilson's attorney's affidavit was a statement of advocacy,
not a statement of proof by a witness. 67 As an alternate basis to
affirm the Commission, the court applied the substantial hardship
exception in Rule 3.7. 68 The court wrote that "[b]alancing the
claimant's interest against the potential prejudice to the opposing
party, ... disqualification was not warranted. ,,69
A judicial opinion from Wisconsin also supports the application
of the lawyer as witness rule to administrative hearings. This case,
Peck v. Meda-Care Ambulance Corp.,1Q involved a malpractice
action by Meda-Care against its attorney because the attorney "both
represented Meda-Care before a National Labor Relations Board
administrative law judge, and testified before the administrative law
judge in that matter on Meda-Care's behalf."7l The trial court had
ordered the attorney to forfeit his fees for work performed after he
knew he would be a witness.72 The intermediate appellate court
62. Id. at 669-70.
63. Id. at 670.
64.Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. !d.
70. Peck v. Meda-Care Ambulance Corp., 457 N.W.2d 538 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990).
71.Id.at540.
72. Id. at 541.
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discussed the lawyer as witness rule as adopted in Wisconsin, and
held it applicable to the NLRB hearing. 73 The court denied any
malpractice liability, however, holding that "it would stretch the
ethical prohibition beyond its function to fashion from it a rule of per
se liability of the attorney to the client.,,74 The court relied on the
principle that violations of rules of professional conduct are not to be
used to define standards of professional care as a basis for civil
liability.75 Significant to this article, however, is that the court
accepted the applicability of the lawyer as witness rule to the earlier
NLRB adjudication.
Snyder v. State Ethics Commission 76 involved a township
supervisor (Snyder) who was accused of violating the Pennsylvania
State Ethics Law when he voted to approve two contracts between
the township and a stone company he owned. 77 At the administrative
hearing before the State Ethics Commission, Snyder sought to call
the prosecuting attorney for the Commission as a witness to testify as
to when the investigation of Snyder had begun and how it had been
handled. 78 The hearing examiner refused to permit Snyder to call the
agency's attorney as a witness. 79 Upon judicial review of the
Commission's ruling contrary to Snyder, the Pennsylvania court
upheld the hearing examiner's decision. 80 The court relied in part on
Rule 3.7 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct for the
proposition that "a lawyer may not act as an advocate in a proceeding
in which the lawyer is also a witness."81 The court reasoned that
because the Commission's attorney would have been disqualified
under Rule 3.7 if he had testified, the Commission would have been
prejudiced. 82 Therefore, the hearing examiner had not abused his

73.Id. at 541-43.
74. /d. at 543.
75.Id.
76. Snyder v. State Ethics Comm'n, 686 A.2d 843 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
77.Id.
78.Id. at 849.
79.Id.
80.Id.
81.Id. at 850.
82. /d.
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discretion in refusing to allow Snyder to call the Commission's
attorney as a witness. 83
B. Informal Bar Association Ethics Committee Opinions
There are a couple ethics opinions from state bar association
ethics committees on the applicability of the attorney/advocate as
witness prohibition in an administrative adjudication. Both support
the position that the lawyer as witness rule does apply to
administrative adjudications.
The Connecticut Committee on
Professional Ethics Informal Opinion 92_1 84 involved an attorney for
the National Labor Relations Board who had been working on a
series of cases for over nine years involving numerous alleged unfair
labor practices. 85 One issue at an upcoming NLRB hearing was the
impact of an earlier settlement agreement on the pending case. 86 An
order had been issued by the NLRB permitting the employer who had
been accused of unfair labor practices to present evidence of the
intent of the parties in the earlier settlement agreement to support the
employer's position that the charge at the upcoming hearing should
not be upheld. 87 The attorney for the NLRB recognized that he
would probably have to testify to the parties' intent in the earlier
settlement agreement because he had been involved in this settlement
agreement. 88 The NLRB attorney requested an opinion from the
Connecticut Bar Association. The attorney asked if he were called to
testify at the NLRB hearing whether he could still act as the attorney
for the NLRB at the NLRB hearing. 89
The Committee on
Professional Ethics of the Connecticut Bar Association relied on both
DR 5-102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 3.7 of
the Rules of Professional Conduct. 9o It opined that the NLRB
attorney could testify and still represent the NLRB at the hearing
83.Id.
84. LEXIS, National Reporter on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
CT Opinions.
85.Id. at #l.
86.Id.
87.Id.
88. !d. at #2.
89.Id.
90. Id. at #2 - #4.
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before the NLRB ALI "[g]iven the limited purpose and scope of your
anticipated testimony, your intense involvement in all these complex
matters for over six years, and the fact that your testimony will not
involve substantive allegations in the case.,,9\
It was the
Committee's opinion that under Rule 3.7(a)(3), "your disqualification
would work substantial hardship on your client.,,92 By applying the
"substantial hardship" exception in Rule 3.7, the Committee took the
position that the lawyer as witness rule was applicable to the NLRB
hearing.
Pennsylvania Informal Ethics Opinion 94_43 93 was offered in
response to a query from an attorney for a state agency who sought
advice whether he could represent the agency at an administrative
hearing where the chief counsel of his office planned to testify.94
The chief counsel had withdrawn his appearance in the case because
of his upcoming testimony.95 The opinion relied on Rule 3.7 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct to reach its conclusion
that the attorney "would be able to represent your governmental
agency ... even though your Chief Counsel has been called to testify
as a witness in the proceeding,,96 unless precluded by the conflict of
interest rules, ie., if the Chief Counsel's testimony would be adverse
to the interest of the agency.97 By opining in this way, the
Pennsylvania bar association ethics committee also took the position
that the lawyer as witness rule applied to administrative hearings.

C. Summary
There is substantial support in judicial opinions, administrative
decisions and state bar association ethics opinions that the lawyer as
witness rule that prohibits an attorney from acting as both an
advocate and a witness in the same case applies to administrative
adjudications. As the next section of this article will demonstrate,
91. !d. at #4.

92. Id.
93. 1994 WL 928029 (Pa. Bar Assn. Comm. Leg. Eth. Prof. Resp. March 28,
1994).
94. Id. at # 1.
95.Id.
96. Id. at #2.
97. Id.
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however, there is also support for the position that the lawyer as
witness rule does not apply to administrative adjudications.
III. SUPPORT FOR THE POSITION THAT THE LAWYER AS WITNESS RULE
DOES NOT APPLY TO ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS

Contrary to the discussion in the preceding section of this article,
there is authority that rejects application of the lawyer as witness rule
to administrative adjudications.
These authorities base their
conclusion on the language of the lawyer as witness provisions in the
ABA Model Code and ABA Model Rules, and on the differences
between judicial trials and administrative hearings. This section will
discuss these authorities.
Robinhood Trails Neighbors v. Winston Salem Zoning Board of
Adjustment,98 a North Carolina case, involved a challenge by
neighborhood residents to the issuance of an off-street parking
special use pennit. 99 At the hearing before the Board of Zoning
Adjustment, the applicant presented the sworn testimony of its
counsel presenting over 1,000 signatures of persons who supported
the zoning change. IOO The attorney, while under oath, also stated that
the subject property was already used for commercial reasons, and
that a bank was across the road. 101 He added that additional parking
would promote safety, would not decrease property values, and that
the lot would be in "hannony" with the rest of the area. 102 After the
close of evidence, the Board approved the special use pennit for the
parking lot. 103 At issue on judicial review was whether the
applicant's attorney had violated North Carolina Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 5-102, based on the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, when he presented sworn
testimony as a witness at the zoning hearing, and if so, whether the
attorney's testimony could be considered in the court's analysis
whether the Board's decision was supported by substantial
98. Robinhood Trails Neighbors v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
261 S.E.2d 520 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
99. /d. at 521.
100. /d.
101. [d.
102. /d. at 521-22.
103. [d. at 522.
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evidence. 104 The North Carolina appellate court held that DR 5-102
did not apply to the zoning hearing. It could "not find a compelling
reason to extend existing law by holding that the evidence presented
by an attorney who testifies while representing a client before a local
administrative board may not be considered by the local
administrative board."los The court was especially influenced by the
fact that the formal rules of evidence that apply in judicial trials are
not binding on administrative hearings. 106 Therefore, the attorney's
testimony was properly part of the administrative record, and the
agency's decision was supported by substantial evidence. 107
Despite its holding that the lawyer as witness rule did not apply to
administrative hearings, the North Carolina Court "strongly
discouragerd] attorneys from serving as both a witness and an
advocate, even if before local administrative boards, unless the
exceptions in DR 5-101(B) or other compelling circumstances
exist."lOS This "strong discouragement" was based on the policy
considerations of the lawyer as witness rule as set forth in Ethical
Consideration 5_9. 109
More recently, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, an
intermediate appellate court, held that the lawyer as witness rule did
not apply to administrative adjudications. Heard
v.
Foxshire

104.Id. at 522-23.
105.Id. at 523.
106.Id.
107.Id.
108. /d.
109. Id. Ethical Consideration 5-9 provides:
Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to decide in a particular
case whether he will be a witness or an advocate. If a lawyer is
both counsel and witness, he becomes more easily impeachable
for interest and thus may be a less effective witness. Conversely,
the opposing counsel may be handicapped in challenging the
credibility of the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an
advocate in the case. An advocate who becomes a witness is in
the unseemly and ineffective position of arguing his own
credibility. The roles of an advocate and of a witness are
inconsistent; the function of an advocate is to advance or argue
the cause of another; while that of a witness is to state facts
objectively.
Id.
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Associates, LLC, I 10 involved a decision by a county board of zoning
appeals to approve a commercial shopping center in a residential
area. I I I One issue was how the opening statement of the applicant's
attorney at the zoning hearing should be treated in determining
whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support the
Board's decision. 112 At the opening of the administrative hearing, the
presiding officer had asked all persons who planned to testify to
stand, raise their right hand, and take an oath to tell the truth.1\3
Several persons were so sworn; the attorney for the applicant did not
stand or take the oath. I 14 The attorney in response to a question from
the presiding officer then stated that he had an opening statement. I IS
The attorney then "proceeded to offer a substantial narrative of his
client's proposed use of the ... lot."116 After this opening statement,
a representative from an engineering and planning firm testified as to
the intended use of the driveway, and how the driveway could be
made "more palatable" to the neighbors in opposition.11 7 This
witness did not discuss the engineering feasibility of the project nor
any traffic studies.1I8 No other witnesses were called. 1I9 The
Board's approval of the project was challenged by neighbors. One
basis of the challenge was that the Board had based its decision on
the opening statement of the applicant's attorney.120
The Maryland intermediate appellate court first discussed the
competency of an attorney for a party to give evidence before an
administrative agency.I21 The court discussed earlier Maryland cases
that bore on this issue. One case l22 involved a zoning reclassification
that had been reversed by the court because of insufficient evidence
110. Heard v. Foxshire Assocs., LLC, 806 A.2d 348 (Md. App. 2002).
111. /d. at 330.
112. /d. at 352.
113. /d.
114. /d.
115. /d.
116. /d.
117.Id.

118.Id.
119. /d.

120. /d. at 353.
121. /d.
122. Baker v. Montgomery County, 215 A.2d 831 (Md. 1966).
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when the only person who testified in favor of the requested rezoning
at the council hearing was the attorney for the applicant. 123 This
holding was "not because the evidence ... was given by applicant's
attorney, but because there was no evidence produced to establish
that there had been a change in conditions" in the area. 124 Another
Maryland case 125 had decided to "leave to another case a more
particularized exploration of whether counsel representing a party in
a zoning matter should testify as a fact or opinion witness.,,126 The
Heard court then discussed Rule 3.7 of the Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct which provides that "a lawyer shall not act as
an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary
witness."127 The court noted that although there were an "abundance
of cases [involving] ... trials of contested matters before a court of
record . . . there is a dearth of cases relating to . . . whether an
attorney for a party should give evidence on behalf of that client at an
administrative hearing.,,128 The court recognized that courts in other
jurisdictions "have reached disparate results.,,129 The Maryland
Court then held that the attorney/advocate as witness prohibition did
not apply to administrative hearings. 130 This was true because the
Rules of Professional Responsibility "draw a distinction between
counsel's conduct in trials before courts of record and hearings
conducted by legislative or adjudicatory bodies."131 The court then
cited Black's Law Dictionary: "A trial is a judicial examination and
determination of issues between parties to an action."132 A "hearing
in comparison is a proceeding of relative formality ... with defmite
issues of fact or of law to be tried. It is frequently used in a broader
and more popular significance to describe whatever takes place

123. Heard, 806 A.2d at 353 (Baker (Md. 1996».
124. Heard, 806 A.2d at 353.
125. Richmarr Helly Hills, Inc. v. American pes, 701 A.2d 879 (Md. App.
1997).
126. Id.at 887 n.lI.
127. Heard, 806 A.2d at 354.
128.1d.
129.1d.
130.1d. at 355.
131.1d.
132.1d.
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before magistrates . . . and to hearings before administrative
agencies."133
The Maryland court then discussed the Comment to Rule 3.9 of
the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. This Comment
provides that "in representation before bodies such as ... executive
and administrative agencies . . . lawyers present facts, formulate
issues and advance argument on the matter under consideration ....
Legislatures and administrative agencies have a right to expect
lawyers to deal with them as they deal with COurtS."134 Comparing
Rule 3.7 and Rule 3.9, the Maryland court concluded that a
distinction exists between a "trial" and a "hearing" when analyzing
the applicability of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 135 It held that
the Rules of Professional Conduct do not preclude the giving of
evidence by an attorney for a party before an administrative
agency. \36 The Maryland court then set forth parameters for
testimony given by the attorney/advocate at an administrative
hearing. 137 The testimony by the attorney/advocate must be given
under oath as a sworn witness. 138 It cannot be given "by way of
statement or narrative as an advocate.,,139 In Heard, the attorney had
not been sworn as a witness; therefore, what the attorney stated at the
hearing about the proposed use of the shopping center was only
argument, not evidence. 14o The court finally held that since the
"evidence" presented by the applicant's attorney could not be
considered, the Board's decision was not supported by substantial
evidence. 141
The Maryland court's textual analysis in Heard deserves further
attention. As discussed below, the language used by the ABA in its
formulations of the lawyer as witness rule, and the rule as adopted in

133.Id.
134.Id.
135.Id.
136.Id.
137.Id.
138.Id.
139.Id.
140.Id.
141.Id.
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most states, may indicate that the lawyer as witness rule does not
apply to administrative adjudications.
The ABA's original formulation of the lawyer as witness rule,
Canon 19, provided that "a lawyer should avoid testifying in court on
behalf of his client.,,142 The use of the word "court" in Canon 19
could be construed to mean that the lawyer as witness prohibition
was intended to apply only to judicial proceedings. Administrative
forums are rarely, if ever, referred to as "courts." Considering that
administrative adjudications played an extremely minor role in the
legal process and professional lives of attorneys at the time Canon 19
was drafted and initially adopted - the beginning of the twentieth
century - it does seem likely that there was no intent to apply the
lawyer as witness rule to administrative adjudications in Canon 19.
From the beginning of the twentieth century until the mid 1960s,
Canon 19 was the accepted statement of the lawyer as witness rule in
every state.
Despite the increased role of administrative
adjudications during this period, the language of Canon 19 was not
changed. In 1969, however, the ABA approved the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. Two provisions of the new Code
replaced Canon 19. Disciplinary Rule 5-101(B) addressed the lawyer
as witness prohibition in terms of not accepting "employment in
contemplated or pending litigation.,,143 Disciplinary Rule 5-102 was
concerned with "withdrawing from the conduct of the trial."l44 The
significance of the ABA's abandonment of the word "court" in
Canon 19 and adoption of the words "litigation" and "trial" in the
Model Code is not clear. It could be argued that the intent of the
Model Code was to expand the application of the lawyer as witness
rule beyond judicial proceedings to now include administrative
hearings. "Litigation" is broad enough to cover administrative
hearings. Less clear is the intent of the word "trial" in the Model
Code. The word "trial" is usually limited to judicial proceedings.
Administrative adjudications are typically referred to as hearings,
although "trial" is sometimes used in reference to administrative
adjudications. 145 Although it is not entirely clear, it is this article's
142. ABA CANONS OF PROF. ETHICS Canon 19 (1908).
143. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B) (1969).
144. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B) (1969).
145. See In the Matter of Certain Plastic Light Duty Screw Anchors, 1984 WL
273813 (USITC 1984) where the AU referred to the motion to disqualify "trial
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conclusion that the use of "litigation" and "trial" in the Model Code
do not demonstrate the ABA's intent to expand the lawyer as witness
rule beyond that covered by Canon 19, ie., trials within the judicial
branch. There is nothing that supports the conclusion that DR 5-101
and DR 5-102 were adopted to expand the scope of Canon 19 to also
cover administrative adjudications.
In 1983, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted
by the ABA. The lawyer as witness rule now appeared as Model
Rule 3.7. The new rule dropped the term "litigation" which had
appeared in DR 5-101, and referred only to a "trial" which had
appeared in DR 5-102. This decision may be interpreted to mean that
the new Model Rule 3.7 was intended to clarify that the lawyer as
witness rule should not apply to all litigation, but only judicial
litigation, i.e., only "trials." This seems plausible, although no
authority has been found for this conclusion. It does seem curious, in
light of the expansion of administrative adjudications from the 1960s
to the 1980s, that Model Rule 3.7 was limited to a "trial." The
Comments to Rule 3.7 may provide more insight (or confusion). In
its discussion of the exception, which permits an attorney/advocate to
testify as to the nature and value of legal services, Comment [3]
states that "in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of
the matter in issue."
Although many administrative agency
adjudicators have the title "administrative law judge" and are often
referred to as "judge," many, probably most, administrative
adjudicators in the United States have titles such as "hearing officer,"
"hearing examiner," or "presiding officer" and are not referred to as
''judge.'' If it was the intent of the ABA in the Model Rules to apply
the "lawyer as witness" rule to agency adjudicators, the word "judge"
in the Comment to Model Rule 3.7 would not seem to be the
appropriate word to use.
The language of Model Rule 3.7 has remained the same since its
adoption in 1983, except for the stylistic change of replacing "except
where" with "unless" before the three exceptions when an
attorney/advocate is permitted to testify. In 2002, however, based on
the recommendation from the Ethics 2000 Commission, the
Comments to Model Rule 3.7 were amended. Most relevant to this
article is that the new Comments to Model Rule 3.7 use the word
counsel," and discussed whether counsel should be disqualified from serving as
advocate at the "trial."
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"tribunal." Comment [I] provides that "[ c]ombining the roles of
advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal ...." Comment [2]
adds that the "tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may
be confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and
witness." Comment [3] continues: "[t]o protect the tribunal, [Model
Rule 3.7(a)] prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously serving as
advocate and necessary witness ...." Comment [4] discusses the
"balance" between the "interests of the client and those of the
tribunal and the opposing party," and "whether the tribunal is likely
to be misled." Finally, Comment [5] refers to situations where the
"tribunal is not likely to be misled." The use of "tribunal" in the
Comments is significant in light of the ABA's adoption in 2002 of a
new Model Rule 1.0(m), Terminology: "Tribunal" New Model Rule
I.O(m) provides that:
"Tribunal" denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding
arbitration proceeding or a legislative body,
administrative agency or other body acting III an
adjudicative capacity.
A legislative body,
administrative agency or other body acts in an
adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the
presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party
or parties, will render a binding legal judgment
directly affecting a party's interests in a particular
matter. 146
The new Comments to Model Rule 3.7, coupled with the new
definition of "Tribunal" in Model Rule I.O(m), demonstrate that in
2002, the ABA attempted to express its intent that the "lawyer as
witness" rule should apply to administrative adjudications. It must
be emphasized, however, that although the Comments were changed
in 2002, to reflect this position, the text of Model Rule 3.7 was not
changed. Model Rule 3.7 was not amended to add "tribunal." Nor
was the word "trial" changed to "adjudicative body" or other similar
term in Model Rule 3.7. 147

146. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(m) (2002).
147. Adding to the lack of certainty on the ABA's position on this issue is that
the amended Comment [6] to Model Rule 3.7 refers to "determining if it is
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Significant to this article is that only a handful of states have
adopted the most recent ABA formulation of the "lawyer as witness"
rule as expressed in Model Rule 3.7 and the 2002 Comment
amendments. Only Arizona,148 Delaware,149 Idaho,lso Maryland lSI
South Dakota,152 and Utah lS3 amended their Comment to Rule 3.7 to
include the reference to a tribunal. The adoption of the new
Comment to Rule 3.7 could support the argument that the "lawyer as
witness" rule applies to administrative hearings in these states.
However, none of these states changed the language in the actual rule
to reflect the change in the Comment. This could be construed to
mean either that the adoption of the new Comment was not intended
to substantively change the Rule to include administrative hearings,
or that the Rule already covered administrative adjudications and
consequently did not require amendment. This latter argument would
not seem plausible in a state such as Maryland where a court has
expressly held the language of Maryland Rule 3.7 does not apply in
administrative adjudications. ls4
The majority of states have in place a "lawyer as witness" rule
which tracks the ABA approach prior to the 2002 Comment
amendments. In other words, the rule in the majority of states is
limited to a "trial," and the Comments in the majority of states refers
to a proceeding before a "judge." Those states that have not adopted
the ABA's most recent comments (which is the only statement by the
ABA that the "lawyer as witness" rule applies to administrative
adjudication),
include Alabama, ISS Alaska,ls6 Arkansas,IS7
Colorado,ls8 Connecticut,IS9 District of Columbia, I60 Florida,161

pennissible to act as an advocate in a trial." The tenn "trial" is also used in other
Comments to Rule 3.7. Model Rule.
148. ARIZONA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.7 (2002).
149. DELAWARE LAWYERS' RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.7 (2002).
150. IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.7(2002).
151. MARYLAND RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.7 (2002).
152. SOUTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.7 (2002).
153. UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 3.7 (2002).
154. Heard v. Foxshire Ass'n., LLC., 806 A2d 348 (Md. App. 2002).
155. ALABAMA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
156. ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
157. ARKANSAS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
158. COLORADO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(2002).
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Georgia,162
Hawaii,163
Indiana,l64
Kansas,165
Kentucky,166
Michigan,169
Minnesota,170
Louisiana,167
Massachusetts,168
Mississippi,171
Missouri,l72
Montana,173
Nevada,174
New
Hampshire ,175 New Jersey ,176 New Mexico,177 North Carolina,178
North Dakota,179 Oklahoma,180 Oregon,181 Pennsylvania,182 Rhode
Island 183
South
Carolina 184
Tennessee 185
Vermont 186
,
' "
Washington,187 West Virginia,188 Wisconsin,189 and Wyoming. 190 In
these states, it is not clear whether the "lawyer as witness" rule
applies to administrative adjudications. This article submits that in
159. CONNECTICUT RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
160. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
161. FLORIDA BAR REGULATION 4-3.7 (2002).
162. GEORGIA RULES AND REGULATIONS, STATE BAR 4-1 02(D), 3.7 (2002).
163. HAWAII RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
164. BURNS INDIANA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
165. KANSAS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
166. KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT RULES R. 3.7(2002).
167. LOUISIANA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
168. ANN. LAW OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT R. 3.07 (2002).
169. MICHIGAN RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
170. MINNESOTA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
171. MISSISSIPPI RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
172. MISSOURI SUPREME COURT RULES R. 4-3.7 (2002).
173. MONTANA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
174. NEVADA SUPREME COURT RULES R. 178 (2002).
175. NEW HAMPSHIRE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(2002).
176. NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
177. NEW MEXICO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-3072002).
178. NORTH CAROLINA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(2002).
179. NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(2002).
180. OKLAHOMA STATE RULES CHAPTER 1, ApPENDIX 3-A, R. 3.7 (2002).
181. OREGON CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 5-102 (2002).
182. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
183. RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT, ART. V, R. 3.7 (2002).
184. SOUTH CAROLINA ApPELLATE COURT RULES R. 3.7 (2002).
185. TENNESSEE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
186. VERMONT PROF'L CONDUCT RULES R. 3.7(2002).
187. WASHINGTON RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
188. WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002).
189. WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT RULES R. 20:3.7(2002).
190. WYOMING RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(2002).
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light of the 2002 Comment amendments by the ABA and the failure
of these states to adopt these amendments, a strong argument exists
that the "lawyer as witness" rule does not apply to administrative
adjudication in the majority of states.
Further support for the position that a majority of states have not
adopted a "lawyer as witness" rule for administrative adjudications is
found in states that have adopted a "lawyer as witness" rule different
from the ABA Model Rule 3.7. Virginia recently adopted a "lawyer
as witness" rule that applies to any "adversarial proceeding."191 In
the Commentary written by the committee which drafted the new
rule, the committee stated that it modified ABA Model Rule 3.7
because it concluded that the Virginia "lawyer as witness" rule
should "apply not just to trials, but to any adversarial proceeding."192
The intent of the Virginia rule is clear; the attorney/advocate as
witness prohibition applies to administrative adjudications.
Texas also does not follow ABA Model Rule 3.7. Texas Rule
3.08 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
provides that a "lawyer shall not accept or continue employment as
an advocate before a tribunal in a contemplated or pending
adjudicatory proceeding if the lawyer knows or believes that the
lawyer is or may be a witness .... ,,193 Comments [1] and [2] to this
Rule also use the term "adjudicatory hearing" in discussing the
application of this prohibition. Comment [8] refers to a lawyer's
"presentation to a tribunal," and "taking an active role before the
tribunal."
The use of terms such as tribunal, adjudicatory
proceeding, and adjudicatory hearing in the "lawyer as witness" rule
in Texas and accompanying comments indicate that the Texas
version of the "lawyer as witness" rule applies to administrative
hearings. It also lends support to the argument that the rule adopted
in the majority of states does not apply to administrative hearings.
New York is another state that has a "lawyer as witness" rule
different from most states. For the most part, the New York
standards for professional conduct are based on the older ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, but the New York
attorney/advocate as witness rule differs from the older ABA Model
191. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 3.7 (2002).
192. [d. at Commentary.
193. TEXAS RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.08 (2002).
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Code position. New York DR 5-102(a) provides that "A lawyer shall
not act or accept employment that contemplates the lawyer's acting
as an advocate on issues of fact before any tribunal,,,194 except in a
few situations. "Tribunal" is defined in Section 1200.01 as including
"all courts, arbitrators and other adjudicatory bodies."195 New York
DR 5-1 02(b) then provides that a lawyer shall not accept employment
in "contemplated or pending litigation" if the lawyer may be called as
a witness. Subsections (c) and (d) of New York DR 5-102 also
reference "contemplated or pending litigation." The language of the
New York rule therefore indicates that the attorney/advocate as
witness prohibition applies in administrative hearings. Significantly,
the language of the New York rules serves to contrast with the more
limited language of the ABA Model Rule 3.7 and the rule adopted in
the majority of states.
Illinois also uses the phrase "contemplated or pending litigation"
in its Rule 3.7,196 but this phrase is stated in reference to a "trial.,,197
An Illinois intermediate appellate court had construed an earlier
version of the Illinois "lawyer as witness" rule which included
language similar to the current Illinois Rule 3.7 to apply only to jury
trials. 198 California's rule expressly is limited to jury trials,199 and
thus clearly does not apply to administrative hearings. Ohio's
"lawyer as witness" rule applies to "contemplated or pending
litigation" at a "trial.,,200 Ohio has not construed its rule, and thus it
is unclear whether it would apply to an administrative hearing.
Maine applies its "lawyer as witness" rule to "contemplated or
pending litigation," and does not later refer to a "trial. ,,20 I This might

194. NEW YORK CONSOLIDATED LAW SERVICE JUDICIARY LAW ApPENDIX,
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR-5-102 (2002).
195. NEW YORK CONSOLIDATED STATUTES § 1200.Q1 (2002).
196. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(A) (2002).
197. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(c) (2002).
198. In re Marriage of Lee, 481 N.E.2d 1045 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). This case is
inconsistent with Lavin v. Civil Servo Comm 'n, discussed earlier. See supra note 12
and accompanying text.
199. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA R. 5-210
(2002). See In re Mortgage & Realty Trust, 95 Bank Rptr. 740 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
200. OHIO CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102 (2002).
201. MAINE BAR RULES, CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY 3.4(0) (2002).
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be interpreted to mean that Maine would apply its Rule to
administrative adjudications, but this is far from certain.
Nebraska's "lawyer as witness" rule is based on the older ABA
Model Code Ethical Considerations. 202 A 1966 Nebraska case
interpreted the previous Nebraska "lawyer as witness" rule which
was based on the ABA Canons to mean that "a lawyer should avoid
testifying in court [on] behalf of his client. ,,203 This "in court"
statement could easily be construed as excluding the rule's
application to administrative adjudications, but the breadth of the
present rule in Nebraska is far from clear. Iowa's "lawyer as
witness" rule 204 is almost identical to that of Nebraska's. It does not
appear to have been interpreted by any Iowa court.
The preceding analysis of the "lawyer as witness" rules in the
different states has been presented to show that the text of the
"lawyer as witness" rule in the majority of states does not clearly
establish that the "lawyer as witness" rule applies in administrative
adjudications. Further support for the position that the majority of
states may not apply the "lawyer as witness" rule to administrative
adjudications is found in the American Law Institute's (ALI)
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers. The Restatement's
Section 108, entitled "An Advocate as a Witness," provides that:
[A] lawyer may not represent a client in a contested
case or trial of a matter in which the lawyer is
expected to testify for the lawyer's client, or the
lawyer does not intend to testify but the lawyer's
testimony would be material to establishing a claim or
defense of the client and the client has not consented .
. . to the lawyer's intention not to testify.205
This Restatement section also includes exceptions for testimony
relating to uncontested matters, testimony relating to the nature and
value of legal services, and if substantial hardship would result from
disqualification. Client waiver is also recognized. Section 108( c)
202. NEBRASKA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC5-1 0 (2002).
203. Nebraska v. Newman, 140 N.W.2d 406 (Neb. 1966).
204. IOWA CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-10 (2002).
205. ALI, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 108( 1)
(2000).
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adds that "[a] lawyer may not represent a client in a litigated matter
pending before a tribunal when the lawyer or a lawyer in the lawyer's
firm will give testimony materially adverse to the position of the
lawyer's client . . . or former client . . . . ,,206 Moreover, this
subsection states that "[a] tribunal should not permit a lawyer to call
opposing trial counsel as a witness unless there is compelling need
for the lawyer's testimony.,,207
The Restatement's use of the terms "contested hearing" and
"tribunal" indicates that the Restatement position is that the "lawyer
as witness" rule applies to administrative adjudications. "Tribunal"
is defined in the Restatement to include "a court, administrative
hearing board, or similar formal body hearing a contested matter
under rules of procedure and evidence.,,208 The Introductory Note to
Chapter 7, "Representing Clients In Litigation," further provides that
whether "the rules considered in this chapter apply depends on
whether the particular procedure in which a lawyer may be engaged
has characteristics ... of the adversary system.,,209 Moreover, the
term "contested case" is a term of art in administrative law typically
defined as "a proceeding before an agency to determine a right, duty,
statutory entitlement, or privilege of a person that is required by
statute or constitution to be determined only after an opportunity for
an agency hearing.,,210 Also relevant is Restatement Section 104
which provides in part that a lawyer representing a client "in an
adjudicative proceeding before a government agency or involving
such an agency as a participant, has the legal rights and
responsibilities of an advocate in a proceeding before a judicial
tribunal.,,211
206. Id. at § 108(3) (2000).
207. Id. at § 108(4) (2000).
208. Id. at Introductory Note, 134 (2000).
209. Id.
210. See Md. Code Ann., State Gov't, § 1O-202(d)(I). The Model State
Administrative Procedure Act of 1981 uses the term "administrative proceeding"
rather than the term "contested case" which was used in the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act of 1961. While the 1981 Model Act does not define
"administrative proceedings" it does establish an elaborate set of procedures
applicable to such proceedings. See Model State Administrative Procedure Act §§
4-101,4-102 (1981).
211. ALI, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 104(3)(a)
(2000).
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The language of the "lawyer as witness" rule adopted in the
ALI's Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers is in stark contrast to
the language of ABA Model Rule 3.7 as adopted in the majority of
states. The Restatement position is clear -- no distinction should
exist between judicial trials and administrative adjudications in
regards to the "lawyer as witness" rule. In both settings, the
attorney/advocate cannot testify as a witness. No state has adopted
the Restatement formulation.
Summary

This article has presented the authorities that support the view
that the "lawyer as witness" rule applies in administrative
adjudications, and has also presented authorities and arguments that
the "lawyer as witness" rule as adopted in the majority of states does
not apply to administrative adjudications. It is this article's position
that enough uncertainty exists in most states that this issue needs to
be clarified. Attorneys and administrative adjudicators should have
clearer guidance on this issue. The remainder of this article will
discuss a proposed solution. It is submitted that the resolution of
whether the "lawyer as witness" rule applies to administrative
adjudications should be based on the policies underlying the "lawyer
as witness" rule and the policies underlying the administrative
adjudicatory process. It is also submitted that any solution should be
adopted as a procedural rule by administrative agencies as part of
each agency's power to regulate its own hearings.
IV. TOWARDS A PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE POLICIES BEHIND THE
"LAWYER AS WITNESS" RULE

In deciding whether the "lawyer as witness" rule should apply to
administrative adjudications, an analysis of whether the policies
which support the rule in judicial proceedings also apply to
administrative adjudications seems useful. As will be discussed in
this section, most, but not all, of the policy reasons for the "lawyer as
witness" rule in judicial proceedings apply to administrative
adjudications.
Therefore, this policy analysis supports the
application ofthe "lawyer as witness" rule in administrative hearings.
However, as the next section will discuss, differences between the
judicial process and the administrative process may lead to the
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conclusion that a different fonnulation of the "lawyer as witness"
rule should be adopted for administrative adjudications.
Various policy reasons have been offered why an attorney who is
representing a client as an advocate should not also offer testimony
as a witness. Some of these policy reasons conflict with each other.
Some have been criticized as illegitimate. As one commentator has
written,
[T]he literature has shown remarkable uncertainty
over the reasons for the rule. Explanations have been
extended by some, only to be refuted by others who
offer their own rationales, which still others reject in
turn. Regrettably, neither the recently formulated
Code of Professional Responsibility nor a recent
Formal Opinion of the American Bar Association's
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
clarifies the matter. Rather, they seem to contain a
hodgepodge of different reasons variously asserted
over the years in support of the rule. 212
Nevertheless, a discussion of this "hodgepodge" of policy reasons
for the "lawyer as witness" rule is useful to this article's attempt to
offer a proposal on the application of the rule to administrative
adjudications. This is true because this article's concern is not
whether the policy considerations are valid, but rather whether they
apply differently to judicial and administrative adjudications.
One justification for the "lawyer as witness" rule is that the dual
role of advocate and witness is confusing to lay jurors. This seems to
be the basis of the first pronouncement of the prohibition in the 1846
English case, Stones v. Byron. 213 In that case, the judge ruled
evidence offered by an attorney inadmissible.

212. Arnold N. Eoker, The Rationale of the Rule That Forbids a Lawyer To Be
Advocate and Witness in the Same Case, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455, 456
(1977).
213. Stones v. Byron, 4 Dowl. & L. 393 (1846).
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v . TOWARDS A PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE POLICIES BEHIND THE
LAWYER As WITNESS RULE

In deciding whether the lawyer as witness rule should apply to
administrative adjudications, an analysis of whether the policies
which support the rule in judicial proceedings also apply to
administrative adjudications seems useful. As will be discussed in
this section, most, but not all, of the policy reasons for the lawyer as
witness rule in judicial proceedings apply to administrative
adjudications.
Therefore, this policy analysis supports the
application of the lawyer as witness rule in administrative hearings.
However, as the next section will discuss, differences between the
judicial process and the administrative process may lead to the
conclusion that a different formulation of the lawyer as witness rule
should be adopted for administrative adjudications.
Various policy reasons have been offered why an attorney who is
representing a client as an advocate should not also offer testimony
as a witness. Some of these policy reasons conflict with each other.
Some have been criticized as illegitimate. As one commentator has
written, "the literature has shown remarkable uncertainty over the
reasons for the rule. Explanations have been extended by some, only
to be refuted by others who offer their own rationales, which still
others reject in tum. Regrettably, neither the recently formulated
Code of Professional Responsibility nor a recent Formal Opinion of
the American Bar Association's Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility clarifies the matter. Rather, they seem to
contain a hodgepodge of different reasons variously asserted over the
years in support of the rule.,,214
Nevertheless, a discussion of this "hodgepodge" of policy reasons
for the lawyer as witness rule is useful to this article's attempt to
offer a proposal on the application of the rule to administrative
adjudications. This is true because this article's concern is not
whether the policy considerations are valid, but rather whether they
apply differently to judicial and administrative adjudications.
One justification for the lawyer as witness rule is that the dual
role of advocate and witness is confusing to lay jurors. This seems to
be the basis of the first pronouncement of the prohibition in the 1846

214. Enker, supra note 212.
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English case, Stones v. Byron. 215 In that case, the judge ruled
evidence offered by an attorney inadmissible. The judge wrote:
The characters of an advocate and a witness should be
sedulously kept apart. The one was a person zealously
and warmly espousing the interests of his client; the
other a person sworn fairly and impartially, without
bias or favor to either party, to tell the truth of what he
had witnessed or heard.
The jury might have
considerable difficulty in separating those statements
which they had heard from a person as advocate, from
those which they had heard from the same person as
witness. 216
Likewise, Professor Wigmore wrote that the lawyer as witness
rule was supported by the:
[F]ear that the testimony of the counsel and his
statements in argument might be so identified in the
minds of the jury that they would give to the argument
a testimonial credit and effect, as if the oath of the
counsel as witness were pledged to it, and thus be
unduly impressed with its weight. 217
Similarly, it has been stated that when a lawyer is both advocate
and witness the ''jury will attach more importance to the testimony of
a lawyer in a case than to an ordinary witness. ,,218
If the lawyer as witness rule is based solely on its significance in
jury trials, then the .~awyer as witness rule should have no place at
administrative adjudications for the obvious reason that there are no

215. Stones, 4 Dowl. & L. 393 (1846).
216. [d. at 394.
217.6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1911(3) (4th ed. 1976); see also
Anderson Producing Inc. v. Koch Oil Co., 929 S.W.2d 416, 430-32 (Tex. 1996)
(Owen, 1., dissenting).
218. Enker, supra note 212, at 460 (quoting State v. Ryan, 22 P.2d 418, 420
(Kan. 1933».
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juries at administrative hearings. 219 But this is not a valid reason to
not apply the lawyer as witness rule to administrative hearings. First,
concern over jury confusion and improper jury deference to the
attorney/advocate's testimony has been criticized as unfounded. The
"circumstance that [the attorney] is both advocate and witness does
not in itself enhance his standing as a witness or make his advocacy
more appealing."22o Rather, "the lawyer's demeanor and his standing
in the community" as well as the lawyer's "reputation or personal
magnetism" is relevant, not the fact that the lawyer appears as both
advocates and witness.221 More importantly, almost every state
applies the lawyer as witness rule to non-jury judicial trials. If the
rule was based solely on the concern of the improper impact on juries
by the dual roles of advocate and witness, the lawyer as witness rule
would be limited to jury trials. This is not SO.222 This policy reason
therefore cannot support the position that the lawyer as witness rule
should not apply to administrative hearings.
There are several justifications for the lawyer as witness rule
which do not appear to apply differently to judicial trials and
administrative hearings. First, it has been argued that the lawyer as
witness rule is based on the view that a lawyer who also serves as a
witness is more easily impeachable and thus a less effective witness
for the lawyer's client. 223 A criticism of this policy reason is that it
does not explain why informed client waiver is not permitted under
the ABA Model Code or ABA Model Rules as adopted in the
majority of states. 224 However, to the extent there is some validity to
these issues of impeachability and effectiveness, this concern is not
219. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Wilson, 805 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991);
United States v. Scandia Interiors, Inc., 1 OCAHO 271 (Dep't of Justice 1990),
1990 WL 512159; In re Certain Sa1inomycin Biomass and Preparations Containing
Same, USITC lnv. No. 337-TA-370 (May 1995), 1995 WL 945673; In re Certain
Convertible Rowing Exercisers, USITC lnv. No. 337-TA-212 (July 1995), 1985
WL303746.
220. Enker, supra note 212, at 461 (quoting John F. Sutton, Jr., The TestifYing
Advocate, 41 TEX. L. REv. 477, 480 (1963».
221. Id.
222. California appears to be the only state whose lawyer as witness rule is
expressly limited to jury trials. See RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT OF THE ST ATE BAR
OF CALIFORNIA R. 5-210 (1988).
223. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9 (1980).
224. See Enker, supra note 212.
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any different in an administrative adjudication or a judicial
proceeding.
Another policy reason in support of the lawyer as witness rule
unrelated to a jury is that when th~ attorney/advocate also testifies,
the opposing party is injured, in that opposing counsel may be
handicapped in challenging the credibility of a fellow attorney.225
This reason is based on the belief that the "professional fraternity,,226
of attorneys will feel constrained in cross examining the opposing
attorney based on some sense of professional courtesy.227 Although
this concern for civility among attorneys is debatable, to the extent it
is a legitimate reason for the lawyer as witness rule, it would seem to
apply equally in judicial and administrative proceedings.
Also offered as a reason for the lawyer as witness rule is that an
advocate who becomes a witness is placed in an "unseemly and
ineffective position of arguing his own credibility.,,228 Although this
reason has been called "too insubstantial,,,229 it does seem to have
some validity. More importantly in regards to this article, however,
is that the "unseemliness," whatever its degree, would seem equal in
a judicial or administrative forum.
Another explanation for the lawyer as witness rule is "to
safeguard ... against the temptation of an attorney, in his zeal for his
client's interest, to color his statements.'mo Although the validity of
this policy reason is questionable in that it presumes a willingness of
an attorney to testify falsely while under oath, its validity (or lack
thereot) is not dependent on whether the proceeding is judicial or
administrative.
Professor Wigmore, although disagreeing that lawyers would in
fact distort the truth if permitted to serve as advocate and witness, did
justify the lawyer as witness rule on the ground that "the public will
think they may, and that the public'S respect for the profession and

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
(1933).

See MODEL CODE, supra note 146, at EC 5-9.
See Enker, supra note 212.
See Int'l Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1294 (2d Cir. 1975).
See MODEL CODE, supra note 146, at EC 5-9.
Enker, supra note 212.
Russell Whitman, Problems of Professional Ethics, 9 A. B.A. J. 123, 124
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confidence in it will be effectively diminished."231 Wigmore wrote
that this policy was "the most potent and most common reason
judicially advanced."232 This reason has been accepted by some
commentators,233 and judges;234 however, it has also been criticized
as "at best a makeweight,,,235 and has been rejected as a legitimate
basis for the prohibition by at least one COurt. 236 If it is assumed that
there is some validity to this argument, it might be argued that the
public's perception of the legal profession is impacted more by
attorneys in high profile judicial trials, especially criminal cases, than
attorneys representing clients in administrative hearings. On the
other hand, there are administrative proceedings such as zoning
hearings which do attract public attention. Therefore, it seems that to
the extent (if any) the public's respect for the legal profession
supports the lawyer as witness rule, it provides support equally to its
application in both judicial and administrative proceedings.
The final justification to the lawyer as witness rule focuses on the
inconsistency between the roles of advocate and witness. The role of
an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of
a witness is to state facts objectively.237 A witness vouches for the
truth of the witness' testimony. Argument, however, derives from
the "force of its reason ... [w]hether the lawyer personally believes
in his client's cause is irrelevant to the evaluation of [the lawyer's]
argument.,,238 As one commentator has written:
It is precisely because the lawyer is not a witness who
personally vouches for what he says, but an advocate
whose arguments are addressed to reason and stand or
fall as they are objectively persuasive, that he is able
to represent either side of the issue . . . [as well as]
231. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1911(2) (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis
omitted).
232. !d.
233. Enker, supra note 212.
234. See Anderson Producing Inc. v. Koch Oil Co., 929 S.W.2d 416, 430-432
(Tex. 1996) (Owen, J., dissenting).
235. Enker, supra note 212
236. Anderson Producing Inc., 929 S.W.2d at 425.
237. Enker, supra note 212.
238.Id.
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represent the criminal, the weak, the socially and
politically unpopular.239
By this thinking, the lawyer as witness rule is essential to the
integrity of the professional role of an attorney.240 The "dual relation
of attorney and witness in a case is not compatible with the
conception of an attorney as an officer of the court.,,24I This
justification for the lawyer as witness rule appears to be the most
satisfying explanation. It is less subject to criticism than the other
policy reasons offered to support the lawyer as witness rule, and does
not conflict with other possible explanations for the rule. Most
importantly to this article, the "inconsistent role" justification for the
lawyer as witness rule applies equally to judicial proceedings and
administrative adjudications. It thus provides solid support for
applying the lawyer as witness rule to administrative hearings.
Summary
The preceding section has set forth the various policy
justifications that have been offered to support the lawyer as witness
rule in judicial trials. All but two -- jury confusion and undue jury
deference to the lawyer's testimony -- apply equally to judicial and
administrative proceedings. If the lawyer as witness rule was
justified solely in jury cases, its application in administrative
adjudications would be inappropriate. This is not so. Just about
every state applies the lawyer as witness rule to non-jury judicial
trials. Moreover, the policy justifications for the lawyer as witness
rule which are not related to a jury are equally valid in administrative
adjudications and judicial trials. The most convincing justification -the inconsistent dual roles of advocate and witness -- applies equally
to judicial and administrative proceedings. Therefore, this article's
conclusion is that the policy reasons for the lawyer as witness rule
support its application in administrative adjudications.

239.Id. at 465.
240. Id; see also S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. P'ship v. 777 S.H. Corp., 508
N.E.2d 647,651 n.4 (N.Y. 1987).
241. United States v. Scandia Interiors, Inc., 1 OCAHO 271 (Dep't of Justice
1990), 1990 WL 512159.
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As the first part of this article has demonstrated, the present state
of the law is not certain. There is authority both applying and not
applying the lawyer as witness rule in administrative hearings. It is
unclear to what extent this issue has received careful attention by the
ABA and by those states that have adopted the ABA formulations of
the lawyer as witness rule. One impression is that administrative
adjudications were "not on the radar screen" when the lawyer as
witness rule was adopted in most states. Some authorities on both
sides of the issue appear to either apply or not apply the lawyer as
witness rule in administrative hearings without any consideration
whether the rule in fact does or should apply. In states, such as
Virginia, which have considered the issue, the decision was made
that the lawyer as witness rule should apply to administrative
hearings. The ALI's Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
also takes this position.
VI. PROPOSED LAWYER As WITNESS RULE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATIONS

It is beyond dispute that today administrative adjudications playa
significant role in our legal system. Decisions of the utmost
importance, impacting on liberty, economic, and societal rights, are
made at administrative adjudications. The development and growth
of central panels in the states as well as the continuing increase in the
professionalization of administrative adjudicators have led to
increased reliance on administrative adjudications to resolve
important matters of personal and public rights. The gap between
judicial trials and administrative adjudications has never been smaller
than it is today, and this gap will continue to decrease. There is no
difference in the role of the attorney/advocate at a judicial trial and at
an administrative adjudication. The role of attorney/advocate is
equally inconsistent with the role of witness in an administrative
adjudication as it is in a judicial trial. Therefore, there appears to be
no reason why an attorney/advocate should be permitted to testify as
a witness at an administrative adjudication while prohibiting the
attorney/advocate from testifying as a witness at a judicial trial.
Therefore, this article's conclusion is that a "lawyer as witness" rule
should apply at administrative adjudications.
This conclusion, however, does not necessarily mean that the
"lawyer as witness" rule should be identical in both judicial and
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administrative forums. It is not necessarily advisable that judicial
adjudication and administrative adjudication always be treated
equally. Failure to recognize and account for differences in the two
adjudicative processes would defeat the purpose of administrative
adjudication. Proposals in this area of law should recognize that
administrative adjudications exist to provide a more flexible,
accessible alternative to judicial trials. Therefore, although this
article proposes that a lawyer as witness rule apply in administrative
adjudications, it is proposed that such a rule differ in some respects
than the ABA formulations of the rule currently in effect in a
majority of states.
It is first suggested· that the "substantial hardship" exception
which is part of the ABA's formulation of the lawyer as witness rule,
and followed by the majority of states, not be the standard for an
exception to an administrative adjudication lawyer as witness rule.
This article proposes that a more flexible exception be adopted that
would allow an attorney/advocate to testify as a witness at an
administrative hearing in more situations that the substantial hardship
exception would permit in judicial trials. Under this proposal, an
attorney/advocate could testify as a witness at an administrative
hearing if there was a showing of "some hardship" unless the
opponent of the testimony could establish prejudice. A motion
would need to be filed with the administrative law judge by the
attorney/advocate who sought to testify as a witness setting forth why
hardship would result to the attorney's client if the attorney were
disqualified from representation at the hearing. Factors relevant to
this inquiry would include: (1) the length of time the attorney has
been on the case;242 (2) whether the attorney stands in a unique
position in understanding the case;243 (3) whether disqualification
would cause delay in the proceedings;244 (4) whether the agency is
operating under any time limits by statute to hold the hearing or

242. See In re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 21 N.R.C. 1707 (1985), 1985
NRC LEXIS 73 (attorney involved for twelve years).
243. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Wilson, 805 S.W.2d 668 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981)
(attorney in unique posture of knowing the weakness and strength of client's
lawsuit).
244. See In re Certain Salinomycin Biomass and Preparations Containing
Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-370 (May 1995), 1995 WL 945673 (substantial
delay would be required if substitute counsel was required).
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render a decision;245 (5) the complexity of the case and whether other
counsel could take over responsibility for the hearing;246 (6) the
professional relationship between the client and the attorney in both
terms of length of the relationship and client dependence upon the
attorney's advice;247 (7) additional expense to the client if the
attorney was disqualified;248 and (8) how crucial the testimony of the
attorney is to the case. 249 A showing of "distinctive value" of the
testimony by the attorney/advocate should not be required. 25o The
claim of hardship, however, should be based on "more than idle
speculation.,,251
Also relevant to this motion to permit the
attorney/advocate to testify at the administrative hearing would be
when it was filed, and when the need for the testimony from the
attorney/advocate was recognized. Motions to permit such testimony
should be looked with disfavor if the need for the testimony was
known well before the hearing but the motion was filed so close to
the hearing that disruption of the hearing process is unavoidable. The
formality of the administrative proceeding is also relevant. It is
submitted that exceptions to the lawyer as witness rule should be
granted more liberally when the administrative process is intended to
be informal. More formal administrative proceedings would require
a stronger showing of hardship than informal hearings. For example,
an exception to the lawyer as witness prohibition should be granted
more liberally in state motor vehicle administration "points" cases
than at a nuclear power plant licensing hearing.
Once a showing of hardship has been made, the ALl should grant
the motion to permit the attorney/advocate to testify unless the
245. See In re Certain Convertible Rowing Exercisers, USITC Inv. No. 337TA-212 (July 1985), 1985 WL 303746.
246. /d.
247. /d.
248. Contra In re Certain Plastic Light Duty Screw Anchors, USITC Inv. No.
337-TA-158 (Jan. 1984), 1984 WL 273813 (additional expense insufficient to
prove substantial hardship).
249. United States v. Scandia Interiors, Inc., 1 OCAHO 271 (Dep't of Justice
1990),1990 WL 512159.
250. Contra MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B) (1980)
(requiring showing of "distinctive value"); see also In re Certain Plastic Light Duty
Screw Anchors, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-158 (Jan. 1984), 1984 WL 273813.
251. See In re Certain Convertible Rowing Exercisers, USITC Inv. No. 337TA-212 (July 1985), 1985 WL 303746.
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opposing party can prove prejudice. 252 General allegations of
prejudice, such as inability to effectively cross examine opposing
counsel because of professional courtesy, should not be sufficient.
Rather, prejudice must be particularized. This proposed lawyer as
witness rule for administrative adjudications should also make clear
that if disqualification is required, other members of the disqualified
attorney's law firm can represent the client. 253 Moreover, under this
article's· proposal, if disqualification was required, the disqualified
attorney could still remain counsel of record and participate in prehearing and post-hearing matters. 254
There appear to be two avenues to the adoption of a lawyer as
witness rule for administrative adjudications. One approach would
be to petition those responsible for the rules of professional conduct
in each state, typically the highest court in the state or the state bar
association, for adoption of a "lawyer as witness" rule expressly
applicable at administrative adjudications. The ABA should also be
lobbied to expressly recognize application of the "lawyer as witness"
rule to administrative adjudications in its Model Rules. Another
approach would be for adjudicating agencies, including central
panels, to adopt a procedural rule covering the admissibility of
testimony from an attorney who is also representing a client at that
adjudicatory hearing. This could be easily accomplished pursuant to
each agency's already existing power to adopt regulations to govern
its own hearings. 255 This second approach may be preferable to
seeking a change in the rules of professional conduct in the states for
a few reasons. First, the procedural rule approach could be more
easily accomplished. Secondly, the "lawyer as witness" rule could be
fashioned to account for differences among different agencies. It is
conceivable that an unemployment insurance agency might adopt
broader exceptions than those adopted by an agency regulating

252. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Wilson, 805 S.W.2d 668,671 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981)
("[b ]alancing the claimant's interest against the potential prejudice to the opposing
party," disqualification was not warranted).
253. See In re Certain Salinomycin Biomass and Preparations Containing
Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-370 (May 1995), 1995 WL 945673.
254. See Scandia Interiors, Inc., I OCAHO 271.
255. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 9-1604(a)(8) (West 2004)
(authorizing the chief administrative law judge of the Maryland Office of
Administrative Hearings to adopt rules of procedure for administrative hearings).
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corporate securities. Adoption by federal agencies of a lawyer as
witness rule would also avoid conflict of laws issues over which
states' rules of professional conduct should apply in federal
administrative adjudications. This issue appears to have arisen in
past cases. 256 All attorneys, no matter where licensed, would be
bound by the same rule practicing before a particular agency. Under
current practice, an attorney licensed in Maryland appearing before
the Federal Communications Commission might be permitted to
serve as advocate and witness under the holding of Heard v. Foxshire
Associates, LLC,257 while an attorney licensed in Virginia appearing
in the same hearing would not be able to serve as both advocate and
witness. 258
VII. CONCLUSION

A lawyer as witness rule which prohibits an attorney from serving
as both an advocate and witness in the same proceeding should be
applied in administrative adjudications. A rule which expressly
adopts this position should be adopted either by the states in their
rules of professional conduct or by agencies in their procedural rules.
A rule which recognizes a broader exception than that applied in
judicial proceedings may be appropriate in administrative
adjudications because of the desire to maintain flexibility and less
formality in the administrative process.

256. See Appeal ofB.G.W. Ltd. P'ship, GSBCA No. 10501 (Aug. 1991), 1991
WL 16871 (discussing whether to apply District of Columbia or Virginia rule).
257. Heard v. Foxshire Assocs., LLC, 806 A.2d 348 (Md. App. 2002).
258. See RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2000). A possible problem might be created if an agency
adopted a lawyer as witness rule with broader exceptions than provided in the rules
of professional conduct which govern the attorney who wants to testify and serve
as advocate. That attorney could conceivably be subject to discipline even though
in compliance with the agency's rules. This might be true, for example, for an
attorney licensed in Virginia who sought to act as advocate and witness before an
agency that granted exceptions liberally. Hopefully, consensus could be reached
that would avoid this problem.

